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NOTES ON RECENT CASES
PATENTS

-

Restrictive covenants -

Contract restraining

seller of a patent from conducting business in United States or
elsewhere held in restraint of trade and not enforceable.
Action by the Kex Manufacturing Company to enjoin the
Plu-Gum Company and others from operating a repair tire concern in the city of Cleveland or elsewhere. Supreme Court of
Ohio, 1928. 162 N. E. 816.
The plaintiff company, which had purchased the business and
patents formerly owned by the defendant company, the patents
and processes being used in the business of repairing and restoring tires, entered into a written contract with the defendant, by
the terms of which the defendant agreed that it would not, either
directly or indirectly, by use of the same process or any similar
process, enter into and carry on the business of repairing tires
anywhere within the United States or in any other country in
which a renewal of the patent, or a patent, might be obtained, and
that the contract was to last during the lifetime of the patent or
any renewals thereof.
It was alleged that almost immediately after the signing of
this contract and the turning over of the business sold by the defendant to the plaintiff, some of the other defendants, who were
stockholders interested in the Plu-Gum Company, procured a
similar process from an owner in New Jersey, and immediately
thereafter, in the same vicinity where their shop had been before
located, started in the business of repairing tires in direct competition with the plaintiff company, and in violation of the terms
of its contract; this action was brought to restrain the defendant
from carrying on this business.
The patent itself, the court said, had nothing to do with the
case, other than to mark out the term for which this contract was
to last, which would be the lifetime of the patent or any renewals
thereof; the real question in the case was whether the agreement
of the defendant not to enter into a like business anywhere in the
United States or in any other country in which a patent might be
obtained during the lifetime of the patent, was a valid and binding
contract. Whether or not it was depended on whether, to pro-
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tect the purchaser of a tire repairing business in Cleveland, it was
necessary to make a contract so broad and extensive that it covered the whole United States or more; if not, it was void as in
unreasonable restraint of trade.
In the early history of the law, contracts in restraint of trade
were held entirely void because, it was alleged, the state was entitled to the services of each of its citizens, and they could be
more useful in the trade in which they were accomplished than
in some other trade. Therefore any contract which would restrain the right of a man to conduct a business was held to be contrary to public policy and invalid, but, in the multiplicity of inventions and in the extension of commerce and trade, the courts
early had to depart from this original proposition, and so they
adopted the policy that, while it was true that contracts in total
restraint of trade were still against public policy, those in partial
restraint of trade were not necessarily so. It would depend on
the question of how extensive the contract in restraint was, or for
how long a time it should last, and the decisions of the courts are
practically uniform to the effect that a contract in restraint of
trade in a reasonable area would not necessarily be invalid, unless
unlimited as to time; and a contract which covered more territory
than was necessary to protect the rights of the purchaser would,
as a rule, be invalid. In other words, a contract which prevented
a man from going into business over such a large area that it
would serve no good to the purchaser, and prevented the state
from having the use of his knowledge at all, was invalid; or if it
were over, a restricted area, and were for all time, it would be
invalid.
The whole business of the plaintiff in this case was to repair
tires, using the patent process purchased from the defendant in
doing so. The repairing of tires can not be a monopoly, since it
is impossible for a repairer of tires to have them shipped for any
great distance, because the freight or express on them would be
greater than the cost of repair; the repairing of tires must be a
local business. Applying the principles laid down, the court held
that the contract, in prohibiting the defendant from engaging in
the business anywhere in the United States, restrained trade over
an unreasonably large area, nd was absolutely void as being
against public policy. And although the parties could have made
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a valid contract prohibiting the defendant from engaging in the
business in Cleveland, the contract was an entire contract, and
could not be divided so as to make it cover a reasonable area,
within which trade could have been lawfully restrained, it must
either fail or be good in its entirety. The contract was so broad,
both as to space and time, as to make it absolutely void, and the
plaintiff was not entitled to maintain the suit in injunction to prevent the defendant from carrying on its business.
J. J. Cant,.
MASTER AND SERVANT-In proceeding under the
Workmen's Compensation Law, injury must arise out of the employment.
This proceeding was brought under the Workmen's Compensation Law, by the widow of one Carlstrom, to recover for his
death, alleged to have resulted from injury arising out of his employment. Carlstrom's Case, Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, 1928. 162 N. E. 893.
The deceased, superintendent of the plant of the subscriber
in Worcester, had accompanied one Billings, treasurer of the subscriber, on a trip from Worcester to Springfield on the employer's
business in an automobile owned by Billings; on their return
home, while trying to avoid colliding with a truck, Billings
caused the automobile in which they were traveling to skid off
the road and down an embankment into a ditch. Billings went
for assistance to tow the car from the ditch, and left the car in
charge of the deceased, who crossed the street to watch tires being loaded on a truck and, it was alleged, to endeavor to get a
chain from the driver of the truck to bring the automobile of
Billings out of the ditch. While standing at the rear.of the truck,
he was struck by another automobile and killed.
The court did not decide whether or not the deceased had
the duty to watch the automobile of Billings and was in the employ of the subscriber while so doing, but held that it was not
necessary to so decide, because when the deceased left the automobile of Billings and crossed the street to watch the loading-of
the truck, his injuries could not be found to have arisen out of his
employment, since there was no casual relation between his employment and the injury; even assuming that it was r-.t of his

THE NOTRE DAME LAWYER
duty or employment to watch the automobile, it was wholly outside that duty for him to cross the street and place himself near
the truck, where he met with the injury. Gardner's Case, 247
Mass. 308, 142 N. E. 32.
Nor could the contention that deceased was acting within the
scope of his employment in endeavoring to get a chain to bring
the automobile back on the road, be sustained; Billings had gone
to secure assistance and the deceased had no duty to perform in
his absence except to guard the car. And apart from these reasons -precluding the claimant from recovering compensation, the
court held it to be the settled law that ordinarily, as all persons
upon streets are exposed to the dangers incident to such travel,
injuries so -sustained by employees do not arise out of employment. Hewitt's Case, 113 N. E. 572; Colarullo's Case, 155 N. E.
425. Therefore, the injury from which deceased died did not
arise out of his employment, and compensation could not be recovered for his death.
J. J. Cant3'.
CRIMINAL LAW-In this case of Yancey v. State, 271 Pac.
170, an appeal is made from a conviction for murder. The appellants contend that the trial court committed error when it allowed
the testimony of an attorney to be admitted as evidence. This
contention is based on the ground that the defendants in the prosecution for murder sent for the attorney whose testimony was
admitted as evidence, for the purpose of retaining him in their
defence. From the facts it appears that the attorney inquired as
to the charge and then named a fee which was not raised and that
nothing further was done in reference to the employment.
It, is well settled that wh4eye an attorney, even where no fee
has been agreed upon, demanded or asked, and though the services rendered are gratuitous, yet if he has discussed the case
with his proposed client or voluntarily listened to his statement
of the case, he is thereby disqualified to accept employment on
the other side of the case, Steeley v. State, 17 Okl. Cr. 252, 187 P.
821. Ward v. State, Okla. Cr. 242 P. 575.
HELD, an attorney however, is not disqualified where he
does not represent or accept employment by the defendant nor
assume to do so, and does not discuss nor voluntarily hear the
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preliminary statement of the defendant, but where the services
of an attorney are sought by one accused of crime, and he merely
ascertains the charge and fixes a fee, which is not paid nor promised and as a consequence the employment is not consumated,
certainly this mere seeking of his services, his inquiry as to the
nature of the charge as a basis for fixing the fee does not disqualify him. No error.
Marc Wonderlin.
SALES-Where parties treat agreement as in force after
delivery date, -contract becomes indefinite as to time, and neither
party can terminate without notice and reasonable opportunity
to perform.
The plaintiff and defendant contracted for the sale and purchase of one thousand automobile frames, plaintiff to furnish
them in equal amounts during the months of March to June inclusive. Later the defendant made changes in the specifications
and as a result, it became impossible to make deliveries at the
time named. Shipments began in May and continued to the middle of July and in that time about one-half the frames had been
delivered. No purpose to rescind because of the delay was expressed by the defendant nor after the last shipment was notice
given to the plaintiff that immediate forwarding of the balance
of he order was necessary to a continuance of the contractual
obligation of the purchaser. Plaintiff commenced work on remaining frames in July and sent invoices to defendant in September but it refused to receive them. Action to recover the agreed
price resulted in the entry of judgment for the defendant after
verdict in favor of the plaintiff. Parish Mfg. Corporation v.
Martin-ParryCorporation. Pa., 1928; 143 A. 103.
The judgment of'the lower court was reversed upon assignment of error, the court deciding that here, time was of the essence of the contract and a failure of the seller to furnish goods
within time stipulated in contract is bar to recovery unless there
has been an express waiver of the obligation or such a waiver is
to be implied from the conduct of the parties; Riddle Co. v.
Taubel, 277 Pa. 95, 120 A. 776; and that where the parties have
treated the agreement as in force after the date specified for
delivery, it becomes indefinite as to time and neither party can
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terminate it without notice to the other to promptly comply.
Hopp v. Bergdoll, 285 Pa. 112, 131 A. 698.
If the one not in default insists that a strict compliance will
thereafter be insisted on, then a reasonable time to complete the
contract must elapse before a recission is justified. There can
be no effective cancellation until proper opportunity is given the
seller to perform, and what constitutes such is ordinarily fbr the
jury. Riddle Co. v. Taubel, supra. The jury in that case found
for the plaintiff.
No request was here made to the seller to complete the shipment and the fact that delivery was not tendered until September
did not in itself constitute a legal defense and the c6urt holding,
as a matter of law, that defendant was relieved of its duty to accept delivery and to pay, committed error under the circumstances and the assignment of error must be sustained.
D. M. Donahue.
AUTOMOBILES-Evidence held to justify finding of driver's negligence in not stopping automobile when blinded by the
lights of other cars.
Plaintiff was walking on highway on a dark, foggy night,
having left the sidewalk because it was in a poor condition and
uncomfortable to walk upon, when she was struck by an auto
operated by the defendant who was driving toward his home at
a moderate rate of speed. Both plaintiff and defendant were on
the right side of the road and defendant's testimony showed that
his vision was obscured by fog and that the lights of cars "following him shone through the rear window of his car and combined
with the lights of approaching cars blinded him so that he did
not see plaintiff. A verdict was had for the plaintiff and defendand brought the case to the Supreme Judicial Court on motion.
Cole v. Wilson, Maine, 1928; 143 A. 178.
Defendant was not guilty of negligence in driving when his
vision was obscured by fog alone. A driver encountering a fog
while on his way home is not obliged to wait for the fog to lift in
order to escape a charge of negligence, but may proceed at a reasonable rate of speed. Johnson v. State of New York, 175 N. Y. S.
299. But if the operator of a machine is blinded by the lights
from another vehicle so that he is unable to distinguish an object
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in front, reasonable care requires that he bring his vehicle to a
stop and a failure to do so justifies a charge of negligence. Jolman v. Alberts, 192 Mich., 25; Topper v. Maple, 181 Ia., 786.
It cannot be said, as a matter of law, that a pedestrian is necessarily guilty of negligence in leaving the sidewalk to walk along
the highway, even though the sidewalk may not be impassable.
Booth v. Meagher, 224 Mass., 472.
Sidewalks are for the exclusive use of pedestrians but the
remaining portion of the highway is not for the exclusive use of
vehicles. In the absence of a statutory or municipal regulation
affecting the question, the pedestrian has equal rights in the
street with the operator of an automobile. Lane v.Sargent, 217 F.
237. But in so using the highway the pedestrian should be most
vigilant for his own safety. Virgilio v. Walker et al., 254 Pa. 241.
The evidence here showed that plaintiff was vigilant and that
defendant was negligent, therefore the Verdict must stand.
D. M. Donahue.
-Emerson et at. v. Speak et at., Supreme Court, of Arkansas,

1928, 9 S.W. (2d) 780.
This was an appeal by the plaintiff below from a judgmen
for the defendant below, by the lower court.
The suit was brought to enforce the collection "of the balanc(
due on notes executed by W. A. Speak, in part payment of the
consideration for a deed to The Northeast Quarter of the Southeast Quarter of Section 17, Township 13 North, Range 8 West,
and another (a 72 acre) tract of land.
Defendant Speak admitted the making of the notes- in question but defended on the ground that the title to the land had
failed. That is, the title to the forty acre tract described above
was in the possession of one J. N. King, who claimed title thereto.
thereto.
The land described was the Northeast corner ot the Southwest quarter which was in fact held by King as his own land.
The real intention of the parties was to convey the Northwest
quarter of the Southwest quarter which was owned by the grantor the plaintiff here. Thus there was a mistake in description of
the land.
The lower court found that the defendant's grantor had never
owned the land described in the deed and could not convey that
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to which he held no title and on that ground gave judgment to the
defendant.
On appeal however the Supreme court held that the intention of the parties to convey and receive the Northwest quarter
was known to them and that a mutual mistake had been made in
description of the land. On clear, convincing and decisive evidence a deed should be reformed for mutual mistake in description
when all necessaTy parties are before the court.
Decree-of lower court was reversed and cause remanded with
directions to reform the deed, to conform to the intentions of the
parties and to render-judgment for unpaid purchase money and to
enforce vendor's lien in the deed to appellee, the grantee.
John P. Berscheid.
NEW TRIAL-On charge 6f murder after former .trial on
same charge and conviction of manslaughter is not double
jeopardy.
The main question which came up for consideration of theUnited States Circuit of Appeals for the First Circuit in the case
of Carbonell v. People of Porto Rico, reported in 27 Federal (Second Series), 253, was whether the defendant was subjected to
double jeopardy, contrary to section 2 of the Porto Rico Organic
Act, 48 USCA section 737.
Carbonell was indicted for murder, and on the first trial, in
the district court, he was found guilty of manslaughter. On his
appeal to the Supreme Court of Porto Rico, the judgment was
reversed. At the second trial defendant pleaded the former conviction as an acquittal of the higher offense and a bar to further
prosecution on the murder charge, and contended that the second
trial must be limited to the manslaughter charge. The trial court
overruled his contentions and he was again found guilty of manslaughter- The judgment was affirmed by the Supreme Court of
Porto Rico, and defendant prosecuted a writ of error to the Circuit Court of Appeals.
Circuit Judge Anderson delivered the opinion of the court,
in which he held that the Porto Rican Organic Act (48 USCA
section 735), continuing existing laws and ordinances in force and
effect, did not thereby adopt the construction by California courts
of double jeopardy provisions, though Porto Rican Penal Code
is largely identical with California Penal Code, especially in view
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of Porto Rican Code Criminal Procedure, section 302, providing
that "the granting of a new trial places the parties in the same
position as if no trial had been had".
The court further' held that the "double jeopardy clause in
the Organic Act of Porto Rico is to be given the same interpretation as corresponding provision in the Fifth Amendment" of the
Federal Constitution, and thereunder, following the decisions of
the Supreme Court of the United States, one whose conviction of
manslaughter under an indictment for murder was reversed was
not subjected to double jeopardy because the new trial was not
limited to manslaughter.
I. S. Angelino.
ARREST-Intoxicating Liquors. Officer smelling whisky
in abandoned house may enter and arrest without warrant person
holding bottle of whisky; evidence that officer smelled whisky in
abandoned house, and on entrance person arrested had in hand
bottle of whisky, which he broke, held sufficient to go to jury on
issue of possession; evidence held to sustain conviction for unlawful possession of intoxicating liquor. Schillings v. State, Supreme Court of Miss. (118 So. 137), June 11, 1928.
One Obe Schillings was tried and convicted for the unlawful
possession of intoxicating liquor, fined $100 and costs, and sentenced to 30 days in jail, but the jail sentence was suspended on
good behavior. From this conviction and sentence, he appeals
to this court.
The facts upon which Schillings was convicted were these:
Joe Hill, a deputy sheriff of Jones County, Miss., was driving
along the public highway between Laurel and Ellisville, and,
while passing a vacant house that had been a restaurant and filling station, he detected the odor of whisky, and got out of his car
to make an investigation. He discovered appellant, with others,
inside the building. Appellant, at the time he (the deputy sheriff)
entered the house, had in his hand a bottle containing liquor, but,
as the deputy sheriff approached him, he broke the bottle over an
old stove which had been left in the abandoned restaurant. The
deputy sheriff testified that there was liquor in said bottle so
broken.
Appellant denied that there was liquor in the bottle, and denied that he had the unlawful possession, ownership, or control
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of any liquor and claimed that the bottle which the deputy sheriff
found in his possession was an empty bottle that had been left in
the old abandoned restaurant. Another witness testified for the
appellant to the same effect.
It was urged for the appellant that the evidence is insufficient to sustain the conviction. The court on this point said:
"As we understand the law, the presence of whisky may be established by smell as well as by vision; and the fact that the
deputy sheriff smelled liquor as he approached the building and
there saw the appellant break the bottle in which there was
whisky, and smelled the whisky as it was spilled upon the floor,
was sufficient to go to the jury upon the question of whether the
appellant was in possession of intoxicating liquor. Having the
bottle in his hand and breaking it himself is a fact which, coupled
with the fact that the bottle contained whisky, when taken in
connection with appellant's denial that there was whisky in the
bottle, is sufficient evidence for the jury to infer that appellant
was the possessor of the liquor."
After overruling, other technical objections, the judgment
was affirmed.
J. S. Angelino.
BILLS AND NOTES. In the case of Olsen v. Hoffman,
221 N. W. 10, the Supreme Court of Minnesota, held that a holder
of notes negotiated by one with defective title has burden of
proving that he acquired title as holder in due course. Every
holder of promissory notes is deemed prima facie to be a holder
in due course: but, when the title of any person who has negotiated them was defective (fraudulently procured), the burden
is on the holder that he, or some other person under whom he
claims to have acquired the title, is a holder in due course.
To constitute notice of fraud in the inception of a promissory note, it must be made to appear that the person to whom it
is negotiated must have had actual knowledge thereof, or knowledge of such facts that his action in taking the paper amounted
to bad faith. The general rule is that the purchaser of negotiable
paper need not make inquiry or investigation as to the maker, but
this rule has its exceptions under special circumstances.
Following a special indorsement on the back transferring a
6 per cent promissory note were the words, "To draw 7 per cent
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from 3-5-1920." Held, this memorandum was surplusage, without legal significance, as between the indorsee and the maker, and
was not of such character as to put the indorsee upon inquiry.
The transferee of negotiable paper need only to sustain the
burden of proof which the law imposes upon him. Where one
purchases commercial paper in good faith, in the usual course of
business, before maturity, for value, and without notice of any
facts affecting the validity of the paper he is entitled to the advantages which the commercial law confers upon a bona fide
holder.
The plaintiff here sues to recover on four $500 promissory
notes. One England was a banker and in 1920 he sold a 160-acre
farm to defendant under a contract for deed, which contained a
provision that if, after two years from the date thereof, defendant
did not want the land, England would take it back and pay back
the money which defendant had paid. England took, with the
contract that he got-from the defendant notes including the ones
here involved for deferred payments. Two years later defendant
exercised his privilege under the contract and surrendered the
land to-England, who told him he had used the notes as collateral,
but that he would get them and return them, but this was never
done.
The plaintiff had in the meantime sent England $2,000 for investment and England sent him back the four notes so given with
said contract. England indorsed and guaranteed the notes.
Plaintiff knew nothing about the defendant, made no inquiry
concerning him, and did not write to him until the fall of 1926
when he for the first time learned the facts.
And the court here laid down the rule that every holder of
promissory notes is deemed prima facie to be a holder in due
course; but when notes are procured by fraud the burden is on
the holder to prove that he or some person under whom he claims
to have acquired the title is a holder in due course. The plaintiff
acted in the ordinary course of business-the record shows that
he acquired the notes in ignorance of the fraud and in good faith.
He paid the face of the notes and acquired them long before maturity. This was sufficient. There was nothing in the transaction to incite suspicion, and therefore juddgment must be for the
plaintiff.
F. Earl Lamboley.
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IMMIGRATION-Indians of "Six Nations" not Affected by
Immigration Laws.
In the case of McCandless, Commissioner of Immigration v.
U. S. ex rel Diabo, reported in 25 Fed. Rep. Second Series, 71, the
question involved is whether the immigration laws of the United
States apply to members of the tribe of the Six Nations born in
Canada. The proceeding was on a writ of habeas corpus by the
United States on the relation of Paul Diabo, against the commissioner of immigration for the port of Philadelphia. The trial
court granted the writ and the respondent appealed.
Diabo was a full-blooded Indian of the Iroquois tribe, known
as the Six Nations and was born on a reservation of that tribe in
the Dominion of Canada. He came to the U. S. first in 1912, and
from then on made a number of trips back and forth, working in
this country as a structural iron worker. In February, 1925, he
was arrested on complaint of Immigration Commissioner McCandless for alleged violation of the law in entering the United
States without complying with the immigration laws.
The Circuit Court of. Appeals, third District, in its opinion
written by Circuit Judge Duffington, upholding Diabo's right to
enter this country at will, held that Indians are all wards of the
nation, and that general acts of Congress do not apply to them,
unless so worded as clearly to manifest an intention to include
them in their operation.
By the Jay Treaty of 1794, it was agreed that members of
the Six Nations, who previous to the American Revolution lived
in territory included in both the United States and Canada, were
to be free to pass and repass the border at will. The respondent
here claims that the War f 1812 annulled the Jay Treaty.
On this point Judge Buffington quotes from the case of
Society v. New Haven, 8 Wheat. 464, 494.
"We are inclined to admit the doctrine urged at the bar, that
treaties become extinguished, ipso facto, by war between the two
.governments, unless they should be revived by an express or implied renewal on the return of peace. ' There may be treaties of
such a nature, as to their object and import, as that war will put
an end to them; but where treaties contemplate a permanent ar-
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rangement of territorial and other national rights, or which, in
their terms, are meant to provide for the event of an intervening
war, it would be against every principle of just interpretation to
hold them extinguished by the event of war."
This case is an authority for the proposition that though a
war may occur between this nation and another, treaties made between this nation and the one it was at war with revive in their
operation at the return of peace, unless new and repugnant stipulations are made.
F. Earl Lainboley.
LITERARY PROPERTY--"Piracy". In the case of Moore
v. Ford Motor ComPany, 28 Fed. (2d) 529, we have the record of
an attempt to show a right to a share of the profits of that well
known organization. The decision is of general interest because
of the fact that a large percentage of the population of the country has at least a superficial acquaintance with a part of the subject matter of the controversy. The principles of law, however,
are of long standing.
The action arose out of the introduction and offer to the
public of the "Ford Weekly Purchase Plan" in the spring of 1923.
Plaintiff alleged and attempted to prove that the defendant had
been guilty of piracy in appropriating plaintiff's idea which he
had communicated to defendant in a letter dated October 25,
1922. The letter set forth a plan which plaintiff believed would
greatly increase the sale of defendant's products. The proposed
plan consisted in the making of monthly deposits by customers
with the Ford dealers, who were to allow interest at the rate of
ten per centum on the deposits and in return would reap the
benefits of an additional sale and also have the use of the money
so deposited. It suggested a deposit of twenty-five dollars per
month for six months. This deposit would then be taken as the
down payment, and the Ford car, truck or' tractor delivered to
the customer. The interest paid on these deposits during the six
months period would amount to only $3.11. Should the customer decide to withdraw his money, it was proposed that interest be allowed at the rate of four per centum. The chief
merits of the plan were its attractive rate of interest on deposits
and the fact that it was designed to reach an entirely new sales
field. Mr. Moore's letter concluded with a submission of the
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plan with the understanding that there should be no obligation
on the part of defendant.
Most of us, as before stated, have at least a passing acquaintance with the Ford Weekly Purchase Plan. It consisted in deposits of five dollars a week by the customer with the local bank,
in accordance with an agreement between the bank and the local
Ford dealer, interest being paid thereon at the regular savings
rate in force at the bank of deposit. At the time of the first deposit the customer was required to select the particular Ford
product toward the purchase of which he would direct the accumulation of his hard earned savings. When a specified amount
had been deposited, the entire sum was turned over to the dealer,
and the car, truck or tractor delivered to the purchaser, who
would then arrange to finance the remainder of the purchase
price, either through channels of his own selection or through
one of the ordinary deferred payment plans offered by defendant.
The benefits of this plan to the Ford Motor Company are quite
apparent, but, although the circular advertising of the defendant
holds to the contrary, its ultimate benefit to the buying public
which it was designed to reach might well be doubted. Its claim
is based upon the assumption that a Ford product is a universal
good. This assumption is scarcely justified by experience.
The action was founded upqn the common law property
right of an author in his work. The United States District
Court for the Southern District of New York held that under the
common law the right secured to an author embraces the form,
sequence and manner of composition in which he expresses the
idea, and not the idea itself. If one discloses an idea to another
who then independently works out the application ther.eof, there
is no invasion of the common law rights of the one who made
such disclosure. The publicity given by defendant to its Weekly
Purchase Plan was evidently not a copy of the letter of plaintiff
in which he submitted his idea. The court found as a fact that
there was not such imitation of plaintiff's literary composition in
setting out the proposed boon to the buying public as would sustain plaintiff's burden of proving that his idea had been adopted
with mere colorable alterations by defendant. In deciding the
case the court distinguishes the two propositions upon the ground
that in Mr. Moore's proposal the payments were to be made
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monthly to the Ford dealers at a high rate of interest, while in
the plan adopted payments were made weekly to local banks at
the regular rate of interest, and neither the dealer nor the defendant were to have the use of the money until a sufficient
amount had accumulated to take care of the down payment.
Both plans, of course, were fundamentally based upon installment payments, but in this there was nothing original or new
which would give plaintiff the right to the exclusive use thereof.
The similarity of the two plans and the fact that defendant's
offer was announced to the public within about five months after
the receipt of plaintiff's suggestions would tend strongly to indicate that there was some causal-relation between them, but
upon the findings of the court it would appear that such seeming
relation is merely the result of the application of the fallacious
principle, "Post hoc, ergo propter hoc", which many of us are too
prone to acknowledge without investigation. There was, -therefore, no invasion of plaintiff's rights, and the bill was accordingly
dismissed.
.Henry Hasley.

